Is the FTSE 250 expensive today?

Unlike the FTSE 100, the FTSE 250 has put in a pretty decent performance over the last couple of decades.

Since it peaked in 2007 (at the end of the early 2000s credit bubble), the FTSE 250 has just about doubled and since its peak in 2000 (at the end of the dot-com bubble) the FTSE 250 has more than tripled.

Given that the FTSE 100 has produced zero capital gains since 1999, a 200+% price increase for the FTSE 250 isn’t too bad at all.

And if you take your starting point as the 2003 low which followed the dot-com bust, the FTSE 250 is up more than 500%.

But have these healthy gains come at the expense of sane valuations? In other words, is the FTSE 250 dangerously expensive?

You can find out what I think on my new website, UKDividendStocks.com:

Is there a bubble in dividend growth shares?

The ongoing problems in the UK and global economies have driven many investors into the arms of safe, defensive companies that can generate consistent dividend growth.  It’s easy to see why this might be an attractive strategy, given the high levels of uncertainty and volatility in the stock market today.

However, the popularity of safe dividend growth shares has caused some people to ask whether this is the next bubble.

At first glance, it seems that there is.  Adam Parker of Morgan Stanley is quoted by Merryn Somerset Webb in MoneyWeek as saying “Defensive stocks are trading near a decade-high relative to their more economically sensitive peers”.

Continue reading “Is there a bubble in dividend growth shares?”

New worksheets (with checklists), spreadsheets and investment guides

I’ve added some new free resources for investors who are serious about making the most of their money.  These include a new investment analysis worksheet, an updated guide to value investing and the latest articles and research by email.

The guide is now more practical than before, walking you through the process of value investing at the same time as going through some of the underlying ideas.

Find out more about these free resources >>

Luminar Annual Results

I bought Luminar back in early 2010 as a turn-around play on the assumption that if (IF) it survived then it might return to average earnings at an average PE, which might be something like 40p and 7 respectively, giving a potential share price of 280p.  Currently, they’re around 9p and I bought at an average of 34p.  Yes, obviously that makes me look pretty stupid and with hindsight, I’d agree.

Continue reading “Luminar Annual Results”

Billington Holdings – One last tangible asset play

“Billington Holdings Plc is a UK based group of companies providing structural steel and safety solution services to the UK market.  Structural Steel comprises Billington Structures, the award-winning and nationally recognised steelwork contractor.  Easi-Edge is a leading provider of Safety Solutions to the construction industry.”
I bought Billington back in November at 85 pence but haven’t got round to analysing in writing yet, so I thought I’d nail this one before moving on to my recent turnaround purchases. 
Continue reading “Billington Holdings – One last tangible asset play”

UK Value Investor portfolio review

At the end of January, my fund was down over 1% taking the rolling one-year figure to 13%, slightly lagging the FTSE 100. 13% is down a long way in relation to the December one-year figure (22%) but that’s due to what happened last January rather than in this one (last year’s was much better). 

The goal as ever is to out-perform the FTSE 100 by an annualised 5% in any rolling 5 year period, but it’s more of a hope than a goal. Having a returns goal in stock market investing is a bit like having the goal of it being sunny tomorrow.

The current effort to increase the number of holdings to twenty stumbled slightly as two companies were sold and two were bought, as detailed below.

Sold – AGA
Somewhat surprisingly, AGA turned out to be the ‘least undervalued’ company on a quantitative basis and its sale returned 22% in only three months.

I bought AGA using version 0.1 of my evolving scoring system, which is a quantitative model to sort and screen stocks for further analysis. I’d say about 80% of any buy decision is based on this score with the remaining 20% going to soft qualitative research.

The model looks for equity selling cheaply relative to its historic earnings and AGA certainly fitted that description.

My quantitative research is quite limited and if you like that sort of thing you will find many better exponents of it listed on the website. When doing this soft research I typically ask just four things:

First, is the company that I’m buying now substantially the same company that produced the historic earnings? It can often be the case that valuable assets are sold off during restructuring and a special dividend pays out the proceeds to shareholders.

In that case, the company is not the company that earned the historic returns and so the numbers are misleading. As far as I could see the AGA I bought was more or less the AGA of the last 10 years, minus their foodservice company which they sold in 2007.

Second, why are the shares so cheap? For AGA the drop in share price started in late 2007 and seemed to be directly tied to the recession rather than anything specific to the company.

Third, is this fixable? Personally, I couldn’t see any reason why after the recession AGA wouldn’t return to more or less the position it was in before, when the shares were in the 300-400p range rather than around 100p. Various commentators were worried about the pension fund, but this was outside my circle of competence, so I ignored it.

Finally, how are they fixing it? According to Frederick M. Zimmerman’s book The Turnaround Experience, successful turnarounds typically focus on core operational issues and incremental improvements rather than launching into new markets, products or businesses. In AGA’s case, they seemed to be dropping non-core businesses even before the recession in order to focus on their consumer operations. Savings are being re-invested to improve and organically grow that core business.

In a nutshell, that’s why I bought AGA. It scored well through a fundamental screen and ranking system and ticked each of my simple qualitative boxes.

AGA was sold because after only three months the rise in share price made it the lowest-scoring holding since the higher the price goes the less ‘value’ is left in the shares. In part this change from scoring high to scoring relatively low was due to a minor change in the scoring system. Hopefully, such changes will become limited in time. It was also a sell target as it took up over 10% of the portfolio and I’m in the process of reducing the size of each holding to increase diversification.

Sold – Airea
Another leaver this month was Airea, the design-led specialist flooring company. Airea was a victim of the move from version 0.1 to 0.2 of my quantitative model mentioned above. Version 0.2 places more emphasis on recent earnings compared to earnings over five years ago and in that respect, Airea had done badly. This meant that the future outlook for the company appeared weaker than I first thought and according to version 0.2, it was already fairly priced which is an automatic sell signal.

The sale resulted in a loss of about 13% in a holding that was about 1% of the fund.

Bought – Enterprise Inns
Enterprise Inns owns a large collection of pubs (almost 7,000) which it leases out to landlords and provides them with additional support in return for various monetary returns. Going by historic earnings the current price is very cheap, and debt is high but not high enough to stop the company from coming near the top of my screen. The four qualitative questions give these answers:

Has the company changed dramatically in the last year or three?

Not that I can see.

Why is it cheap?

The recession is the obvious and rational reason. People are squeezed and don’t have the money to spend on quite so much booze. The company also has a lot of debt which seems to scare some investors, but that is already factored into my quantitative model and the potential rewards outweigh this risk. A detailed analysis of the debt is not my area of expertise.

Is it fixable?

I don’t think that pubs are going the way of Blockbuster, so this looks like a cyclical downturn rather than a terminal decline to me.

What are they doing to fix it?

They seem to have two main strategies. One is to sell non-core pubs and the other is a sale and leaseback scheme which sold 71 pubs in 2010 and it’s expected to be around the same figure next year. Both of these are focused on the core business rather than trying some new-fangled idea.

On that basis around 4% of the fund went into Enterprise Inns with a current target price of 330p which I don’t think it will get anywhere near within the next year.

Bought – Hampson Industries
Hampson Industries is an international group serving the global aerospace industry. According to the website:

“Hampson is now the world’s largest supplier of highly engineered, close tolerance tooling systems for the fabrication and assembly of both metal and composite structures for commercial and military aircraft and space applications.”

My model suggests a possible share price increase of around 150-200%, which of course is up to Mr Market and not me, unfortunately. And so to my four questions:

Is it still the same company?

Yes, more or less. They have been buying companies over the last few years and selling some, but overall the basics of the business appear to be the same as they have been for the past few years.

Why so cheap?

The recession is once again the answer; although in this case the global recession rather than the UK one.

Is it fixable?

As with Enterprise Inns, this isn’t a problem with the company as such, it’s just a knock-on effect of the global downturn.

How are they fixing it?

The response seems to be operational improvements and major restructuring where required, which is what I like to see rather than a radical shakeup of the business.

Again about 4% of the total fund went into Hampson as I’m aiming for around 20 holdings.

New Stockopedia fund
Since there is a good chance that I am making up these results I have started a mirror fund on the Stockopedia website. They are entirely independent of me so I cannot fix the results (of course if my results are rubbish they are unlikely to be fixed). The trades will be the same as for my personal account, just a day or so later. Don’t be too critical of its performance though as the fund only began a few weeks ago; please give it a year or three before passing judgement. 

Unfortunately, their ‘fantasy fund’ system seems to be down as I write this so I’ll add a link to my static pages once it’s up and running again.

Adding Armour to the value portfolio

On January 6th I put 4% of the UKVI ‘aggressive’ fund into Armour Group at 7.46 pence.  The 4% came from existing cash from the sale of Victoria.  At the time Armour came top of the UKVI valuation table, with a ‘returns yield’ of about 40% and according to their website

“Armour Group is the UK’s leading consumer electronics group within the home and in-car communication and entertainment markets.”

The company trades on the AIM index, which I’m not so keen on as they live outside of the tax haven of an ISA wrapper, so it’s not for those investors who only have money in an ISA, but I have a little bit outside the wrapper so that’s okay.

The key data are as follows:

ROE10 = 9.2%, ROE5 = 7.5%, ROE3 = 5%, P/B = 0.18, market cap = 5.3M

As is typical of many value investments, the trend in earnings is downward, but that’s fine as earnings mean reversion is one of the main causes of share mispricing.  Typically companies rebound faster and better than expected.

This leaves my cash position at about 14% which is spot on the current cash target.  The cash target for the ‘aggressive’ portfolio is half that used in the ‘defensive’ portfolio described in detail here.

April Update – Victoria gets a boost

Back to normal this month, with next to nothing going on other than volcanoes and general elections campaigns.  If you’re interested, please check out the Current Holdings, Trade History and Benchmark pages for the most recent updates.

Current Holdings

Electronic Data Processing made me happy by paying out a small dividend after I’d sold them, bringing the annualised returns for that company to 20% during my brief period of ownership.

The cash that I had left at the end of March went into Victoria, an existing holding.  I increased this holding because I didn’t really want to add another new holding – I like to hold around 10 companies – and it was the cheapest by price to book those companies where I didn’t already have more than 10% of the portfolio invested.  

On the downside I don’t really rate Victoria’s chances of being a big gainer as it hasn’t traded much above its current price in the past – i.e. there is technical resistance – and it hasn’t traded at book value for years and years, which doesn’t bode well for my mean reversion theory.  However, who am I to say what the future holds?  Given that I think most analysts are as good at seeing the future as house bricks I ignored my own fears and upped the holding.

Benchmark

The benchmark figures this month are less ego-boosting than last month, but at least they are not depressing.  Once I get some 6-month and 1-year figures I think I’ll drop the 1 and 3-month comparisons from the table as I think 1 and 3-month benchmarking is for the short-term traders.  Eventually, I’ll probably just do 1, 3 and 5-year comparisons to the FTSE 100, with 5 years being the important one.

FTSE 100: 3.7% over my newly adjusted Fair Value

After my attempts to assign a ‘fair value’ to the FTSE 100 last month, the blogger over at Retirement Investing Today pointed out that my assumption that the long-run average CAPE is 16.4 (taken straight from Shiller’s S&P data) is a bit too simplistic.  It is a fact that the UK markets typically have a lower PE than the US.  

Since I have earnings data going back to 1993 I can only produce CAPE going back to 2002, which is only 8 years and a bit crummy.  By looking at how far the S&P’s CAPE was over the long-term average during the 1993 to 2010 period and extrapolating that onto the FTSE 100, gives an expected long-term average FTSE 100 CAPE of 11.2.  Once again the decimal point is probably going a bit too far.

In my opinion, this is too low as I think the US markets were more overvalued in the dot com bubble than in the UK, but of course, that’s my opinion and probably has no basis in fact.  

However, I think it’s not unreasonable to move my expected average FTSE 100 CAPE to 13.8, the midpoint of those two values.  On that basis, I think the current fair value (i.e. the value that will give a future risk/return profile similar to the long-term historic one) is 5,645. Given that it’s 5,445 right now then I’d say it’s only 3.7% overvalued, which in the big scheme of things is virtually nothing.

House Prices: Still a crazy 37% over fair value

Jeremy Grantham thinks the UK housing market is one of only two financial bubbles yet to pop.  Well, I think it popped two years ago, but the government has done an amazing job of patching up the hole.  That doesn’t change the fact that the air supply is fading and the rubbing is wearing thin.  High oil prices may yet prove to be the needle once again.

Dividends by the bucket load

March has been the busiest month at the UK Value Investor head office (spare bedroom) for a long time. I’ve had reports from Mallett and J Smart, a report and strategic review from French Connection (I love their new website) and dividends from Waterman, Gleeson, Northamber and Titon. Then there’s the somewhat infamous purchase of Luminar, a company so scary it seems that almost no one will touch it.

Continue reading “Dividends by the bucket load”

Luminar, bond allocation and checklists

With the impending dividend payout from MJ Gleeson, I’ve been thinking about what to do with it. I mentioned at some point in the past that I wanted to hold more cash and bonds, using the CAPE-based function I’ve posted about before. That function calculates my cash or bond holdings using the value of the FTSE 100 and is therefore suitable for portfolios where the stock holding is an index tracker following the FTSE 100. In fact, that’s exactly what I’ve used it for so far when annually re-balancing my wife’s pension and currently the bond allocation is about 30%.

However, the value investing portfolio which is the focus of this blog is most definitely not a FTSE 100 tracker. The shares in my portfolio live in a dark little corner of the size and value grid where academia says out-performance is most easily had. On that basis, I don’t think I should hold cash or bonds based on the value of the FTSE 100. What I’ve decided to do instead is to be as fully invested as is sensible (i.e. if I have £100 cash there’s no point investing it since the trade commission will be about £10).

Once I get my hands on the MJ Gleeson dividend and sell my bond holdings I’ll have about £3,000 cash to invest, and Luminar is looking like a high risk high reward place to put it. This big nightclub operator is very cheap, both tangibly and intangibly. It doesn’t have quite the low debt levels I typically like, but it doesn’t seem to be drowning in debt. On the downside, they’ve just lost the founder and chief executive; and one of their major investments has just gone into administration probably wiping its ~£17 million value from the balance sheet. Further to the downside the company has lost over 50% of its tangible assets over the last 5 years which, although bad, pales next to the 90+% paper losses of shareholders.

This is as good an example of why value investors are a rare breed as you are likely to find. Only the maddest or hardiest of souls would give money to a company with such a poor record. Will I become one of them?

For those of you who are interested in this sort of thing, I’ve added a Checklist page to list the (semi) mechanical steps I take when investing. The whole area of checklists and why we need them is very interesting in itself and I’d recommend both The Checklist Manifesto and Work the System as an introduction.

French Connection’s strategic review

With a report titled “Restructuring to return French Connection to Profitability”, the team at French Connection have start the real work of turning their fortunes around.  I’m not really a details sort of person, so the main points are that they are selling the Nicole Farhi brand and loss making stores internationally.  I hate to speculate about the future, but generally I’d say this is a good thing and the markets seem to agree as it’s been up by over 10% today.


More importantly for me, the report comes attached to the preliminary results for the year ended 31 Jan 2010.  The sole point of interest here is that the book value of the company has changed from £83.2 million at the interim report to £72.3 million now.  The market cap is currently £43 million so it’s still cheap by my simple metrics.  All in all I’ve lost a little book value but gained some market value, neither of which should make me jump for joy nor cry into my tea.  I wonder if they’ll give me a discount on a new shirt?

Benchmark Comparison – Version 1

I’ve chosen the iShares FTSE 100 as my benchmark as it’s about as near as you’re going to get to holding the FTSE 100 directly.  It’s also easy to calculate total returns (returns assuming dividends are reinvested automatically) as they have a nice table of 1, 3 and 6-month returns, and 1, 3 and 5-year returns.

Continue reading “Benchmark Comparison – Version 1”

Purchased – Waterman Group

I first bought Waterman on October 22nd 2009.  I had recently sold Harvard International for a profit of £4,102.82 and needed somewhere to put the proceeds and some additional cash.  Waterman marked a slight change in my rules.  Whereas before I would only invest when a company was trading below 2/3 of tangible book, I decided to allow intangibles into my valuations.

The idea is that on average intangible assets do produce economic benefits (i.e. earnings) to justify themselves.  I have no evidence to support this other than that the majority of companies I have looked at have traded above book value, including intangibles, at some point in the last five years.  Allowing intangibles into my valuations also expands on the sorts of companies I can invest in, such as Waterman.  Waterman is an engineering and environmental consultancy group where goodwill has been paid for mergers or acquisitions in the past.

A much more extensive and interesting report on Waterman has been recently written up by Richard Beddard whose Thrifty 30 is broadly similar to what I’m trying to do, but is very different in that it’s earnings rather than asset-driven.

This purchase has already been updated on my Trade History page.